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PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN FINANCING ROAD NETWORK IN NIGERIA: A 








The 'build-operate-transfer' concession or BOT model has become a popular finance option 
in both developed and developing countries for infrastructural development. However, 
achieving the basic BOT objectives of quick, efficient and privately financed infrastructure 
has proven to be difficult due to inherent issues that, most times, are left unattended to by 
parties to BOT agreement. This study identifies such critical issues as contractual 
incompleteness, financial and political uncertainties. The study recommends that these 
critical issues have to be addressed before a country like Nigeria with a glaring weak and 
corrupt legal system, shaky and weak financial system and political instability will begin to 
enjoy the advantages in the BOT framework.
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Introduction
A growing trend has emerged among government in many countries, including the developed and 
developing ones, to solicit investment for public projects from the private sector. The main reasons for this 
trend are a shortage of public fund amidst increasing demand from a rapidly growing population, who are faced 
with declining infrastructural services from the public sector and encouraged by their declining income and 
purchasing power. These people are however buoyed by the advent of democratic governance and the resultant 
strengthening of the civil society to demand for improved social services. Moreover, the changing economic 
paradigm that requires a hands-off approach of government parastatals and agencies, given their inherent 
inefficiency and gross mismanagement to the private sector.
The Build-Operate and Transfer (BOT) approach is an option for the government to outsource public 
projects to the private sector for financing, management and subsequent transfer to the government at zero cost.
The BOT is therefore, a development technique for infrastructural projects by using private initiative and 
funding, with the primary function to serve public needs, to provide social services and provide economic 
activity in the private sector, example includes roads, bridges, provision of water, seaports, airports and public 
building (Vaughan and Pollard, 1984).
However, achieving the basic BOT objectives has proven to be difficult in practice due to inherent 
issues which most times are left unattended to and which this study attempts to discuss. To achieve this, this 
study is divided into five sections. Preceding section one, which is the introduction, is section two which 
discusses the road network in Nigeria. Section three presents the BOT model, its variants and history. In section 
four, it looks at the critical issues arising from the use of the BOT model. While section five, presents the 
conclusion of the study.
The Road Network in Nigeria
Nigeria's road network falls into three categories, trunk A roads owned and managed by the federal 
government which links the major cities in the country. Trunk B roads which are owned and managed by state 
governments which links major towns in a state and trunk C roads which are owned and managed by the local 
 
governments. Trunk C roads are known as feeder roads, which transport the bulk of agricultural goods and the 
population from the hinterland to the major towns and cities.
The road transportation sector is a central sector in the Nigeria economy contributing 5.5% to the 
overall gross domestic product (GDP) and accounts for about 90% of the movement of passengers and traffic 
(Edun and Modie, 2000; Oni, 1999). The road network in Nigeria, which is generally regarded as being 
extensive with a length of 193200 kilometres, cannot meet the accessibility and mobility requirement of a 
country with Nigeria's size and population. The road network suffers from serious deficiencies in a number of 
areas as shown in Table 1.
 
Table 1 Distribution of Road Network in Nigeria
Types of Pavement Federal States Local govts Total
Paved Trunk Roads 26,500 10,400 - 36,900
Unpaved Trunk Roads 5,600 20,100 - 25,700
Urban Roads - - 21,900 21,900
Main Rural Roads - - 72,800 72,800
Village Access Roads - - 35,900 35,900
Total; Km 32,100 30,500 130,600 193,200
Percentage 17 16 67 100
Source: Road Vision 2000 Steering Committee Information Brochure, p.4 Transport in Nigeria in 2020.
The distribution of road network shows that there are 32,100 Km. of Trunk A, which is 17% of the total road 
network in Nigeria. There are 30,500 Km of Trunk B road which translate to 16% of the total road network. 
There exist 130,600 Km of feeder or Trunk C roads, which is 67% of the total road network.
Table 2 Condition of Road Network in Nigeria
Paved Roads Good Poor Unpaved Roads Good Poor
Trunk A 50% 50% Trunk A 6% 94%
Trunk B 60% 40% Trunk B 7% 93%
Trunk c 5% 95% Trunk C 4.2% 95.8%
Source:  Edun. F and Modie. O (2000)
The failure to reform the existing situation where government fund the road sector even in the face of 
dwindling financial resources and competing demand from other sector has put Nigeria's road network in 
jeopardy to the point where over 90% of the road network is in deplorable condition. Moreover, there is 
increasing rate of road accidents and high fatalities. The road asset is estimated to be suffering from about N80 
billion due to lack of maintenance and road users suffer additional vehicle operating cost of N53 billion due to 
poor condition of the roads. The above total annual financial loss of N133 billion per annum represents 5.5% 
of 1994 Gross Domestic Product (GDP). When these losses are added to the economic costs from road 
accidents, loss of productive man-hours etc., arising from poor condition of the road network, it becomes 
obvious that the situation needs urgent attention. (Oni,1999).
The government of Nigeria has been concerned with and constantly makes attempt at investing in the 
improvement of the road infrastructure. Government budgetary allocations are inadequate considering the 
requirement of the road transport sector. Overall, current estimate suggests that a financing gap of about $3 
billion per annum exists, that must be filled, if Nigeria is to meet its infrastructural needs (Okonjo-Iweala, 
2005)     
The government therefore, should consider partnership with the private sector for road infrastructure 
development through the Built Operate and Transfer (BTO) as an alternative means of complementing her 
efforts and the speedy delivery of road infrastructure for national development.     
The BOT Model
The BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) model is a new approach to infrastructure development, which 
enables direct private sector financing and investment in large-scale projects such as roads, bridges and 
power plants. The theory of BOT is quite simple, it is made up of three principal components namely:
  Build: A private company (or consortium) agrees with a government to invest in a public 
infrastructure project (such as a road or power station). The company then secures their own financing to 
construct the project.
 Operate: The private developer then owns, maintains and manages the facility for an agreed 
concessionary period (e.g. 20 years) and recoups its investment through charges or tolls (e.g. road 
tolls or electricity sales).
 Transfer: After the concessionary period the company transfers ownership and operation of 
the facility to the government or relevant state authority at no zero cost.
A key characteristic of BOT model is private financing (Sebastian et al, 1996). When a 
government outsourced the development of a public project, one of the risks inherited by the private 
sector is finance and which must be sourced. A prerequisite for private financing is a need for the 
project to be developed. It is only when a market analysis justifies a need will private parties be 
willing to financially participate as well as become involved in developing the project.
.
Variants of the BOT Model
There are different and alternative models of the BOT approaches. These are:
Build-Transfer Scheme: The contractor undertakes the construction, including financing, of a given 
infrastructure facility, and its turnover after completion to the public-sector body concerned which pays 
the contractor its total investment expended on the project, plus a reasonable rate of return. This 
arrangement may be employed in the construction of any project, including critical facilities that, for 
security or strategic reasons, must be operated directly by the Government. 
Build-Transfer-Lease-Operate Scheme: The public-sector body concerned is the direct borrower 
which leases back the infrastructure to the contractor at a rate matching the amortization schedule. 
Build-Own-Operate: The private party retains ownership of the facility, makes returns on investment 
by operating it for its useful life, and may sell it at any point at market value.
The most important identifying criterion of a BOT is that it is a project that can be economically 
and operationally isolated from related operations so that its revenue streams and costs basis can be 
clearly identified and assessed (Handley, 1997). This is crucial not only for determining the commercial 
viability of a project but also for its successful launching and management. 
History of the BOT Model
The first official private facility development under the name “Build Operate Transfer” was used in 
Turkey in 1984 by Turgut Ozal as part of an enormous privatization programme to develop new 
infrastructure (Beuker, 1988). However, the BOT approach was used as early as 1782 for a water system 
in Paris (Handley 1997) and in 1834 with the development of the Suez Canal. This revenue-producing 
canal, financed by European capital with Egyptian financial support, had a concession to design, 
construct, and operate assigned to the Egyptian ruler Pasha Muhammad Ali (Levy, 1996).
Since the beginning of the 1990s power generation, telecommunication, sewage and water, railway 
and roads have been constructed in United State of America, England and Latin America with the help of 
private financing under the BOT model (Mobsby, 1992; Handley, 1997).
 Across Asia and Africa the BOT model has become hugely popular, especially with poverty and 
capital-stricken countries of these regions, where the model has been seen as a one-off, quick fix solution 
to infrastructural bottleneck (Handley, 1997).
Advantage of the BOT Model
Although the benefits of BOT are directly depended to the specific project and its economical 
environment, there is a number of general characteristics that make them attractive. BOT helps 
governments to transfer financial resources that would have been spent on some capital projects to 
finance social and educational programmes that will help to increase social welfare. For instance, instead 
of spending billions of Naira of the Nigeria's government's limited annual budget on the construction of 
roads and railways whilst poor parents have to pay for the education of their children, which has caused 
most children to drop out of school, the government could engage private financial corporations to build 
and manage the roads and railways on BOT basis whilst the government redirects the limited budget to 
create free universal education for all in the country. Thus, countries are provided with an opportunity to 
finance projects without involving public funds.
Another main advantage of the BOT system, according to Tam (1999) is that, the host 
government needs not spend any public fund but can still provide a public facility to her people. Projects 
financed under the BOT system are justified so far as governments are unable to undertake needed 
improvements in infrastructure due to financial constraints (David and Fernando, 1995). The scheme 
enables the government to achieve its goal of infrastructural development without expanding the 
public sector. Since, in a BOT project, a private concern raises finance and builds an infrastructure, 
operates and manages it for a given period of time (known as franchise period) at the end of which 
ownership of the infrastructure is transferred to the government, usually after a token payment. 
Countries have benefited from the expertise and experience of the concession company.
Moreover, a BOT project is driven by commercial incentives. Hence, the concession company 
tends to undertake the quickest and most efficient way of installing the infrastructural facility and to 
manage them efficiently.
Financial, investment, construction and technological risks involved in a BOT projects are 
shifted to the concession company.
Finally, Investments are stimulated and privatisation is promoted, taxes and royalties arising 
from the privatisation process, as well as the improvement in operating inefficiency can help 
government to generate more revenue and promote social welfare. 
Taking a Look at the Critical Issues in BOT Model
Contractual Incompleteness
Infrastructure investments, being long-term in gestation, inherently involve long-term 
contracts. The very fact that long-term obligations are committed ex ante and the benefits for which 
are realizable ex post results in contract incompleteness. Economic literature explains that complete 
contracts are very hard to specify because of the high transaction costs involved, non-verifiability of 
information, uncertainty of future events and lack of commitment to renegotiate. Moreover, bounded 
rationality, due to uncertainty of exogenous events and weak computational ability of economic 
agents, constrains the parties' ability to cover everything and write these into the long-term contracts. 
Williamson (1975 and 1985) identified the possibility of “hold up,” a principal-agent problem which 
basically predicts this after the long-term investment. For example, on an infrastructure facility has 
been made ex ante by a party to a trade transaction, which investment is largely sunk due to its 
specificity, the other party may behave opportunistically ex post. The latter can do this by reneging on 
the agreement to use the contracted facility or threatening not to use it if the price is not lowered. 
Accordingly, since the specific investments cannot be protected by an ex-ante contract, incentives are 
not properly aligned such that under-investment may occurthe investor anticipates her exploitation 
and under-invests (Llanto, 2003)
Financial Uncertainties
BOT financing involves project-financing method. That is, financing is based mainly or 
wholly on the assets and cash flows of the project with limited or no recourse to collateral external to 
the project (Hundley, 1999). The technique of risk management in project finance is well developed. 
But they face particular challenge in a developing country like Nigeria, with a weak and corrupt legal 
system, and an unstable and undeveloped financial system and a potential political instability. 
Moreover, satisfying the requirement of domestic financier in a BOT project can be time-consuming 
given the fact that Commercial Banks and other domestic financiers are wary of BOT financing 
because of its long gestation period. In the case where foreign capital participation is required, a 
tougher examination of the project commercial and market potentials and its risks, and a more 
strenuous process of due diligence are required.
Legal Uncertainties
The legal framework, especially the ability to enforce property rights, contracts and have an 
accessible and impartial venue for dispute resolution, is a key element of the enabling environment for 
the BOT model to thrive. In Nigeria, the courts have been ineffective as the primary venue for 
enforcement of rights and dispute resolution. The reason for this is not far-fetched. Successive 
government in Nigeria (both Military and Civilian) targeted the courts as an obstacle to the arbitrary 
mode of governance  which prevailed, and their authority was purposely undermined, thereby 
fostering a weak and corrupt legal system with the attendant legal uncertainties.  
 
Political Uncertainties
Whether in public or private sector, big ticket and lucrative infrastructural projects like the award 
of road contract are financially rewarding and highly political. Because of this reason and because BOT 
removes control over infrastructural development from bureaucrats and state officials, they tend to be 
what Hundley (1999) called political and bureaucratic resistance. This political and bureaucratic 
resistance has been known to create political instability. Moreover, bureaucratic and political or rent 
seekers sentiments can be real threat to successful implementation of BOT projects. In Nigeria, the youth 
and militancy resistance in the Niger Delta and the politicization of the award of contract are a pointer to 
this fact.  
Conclusion
The use of BOT model to finance road infrastructure is one alternative that could be used to relieve 
the dilemma faced by the government on many competing budgetary needs, given the inherent advantage, 
desirability and necessity.
However, the critical issues raised have highlighted the difficulties of implementing a large BOT 
project in a country like Nigeria with glaring weak and corrupt legal system, shaky and weak financial 
system and potential political instability. These have to be addressed before the country can enjoy the 
advantages inherent in the BOT model.
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